Secret Trials by Cole, David
Georgetown University Law Center 




Georgetown University Law Center, cole@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1830 
 
28 Hum. Rts. 8 (2001) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Immigration Law Commons, and the National Security Law Commons 
:Vtn March 1998, Hany Kiareldeen, a
thirty-year-old Palestinian immigrant
Sliving in New Jersey, was arrested by
United States immigration authorities
and imprisoned. Immigration officials
told him only that his presence in the
United States threatened national securi-
ty; when Kiareldeen asked why, he was
told that the evidence supporting the
charge was secret and could not be
revealed to him. Kiareldeen spent nine-
teen months in prison, without seeing
the evidence that placed him there,
before a federal judge ruled in October
1999 that his detention was unconstitu-
tional and ordered his release.
The government's principal source
appears to have been Kiareldeen's ex-
wife, with whom he was in a custody
dispute over their child. She had made
numerous false allegations against him
in the course of the dispute, all of which
had been dismissed by local officials.
But one allegation, that he was associat-
ed with terrorists, was passed on to the
FBI, and that wholly unfounded allega-
tion landed him in jail for more than
nineteen months.
Today, Hany Kiareldeen is a free
man. But U.S. immigration authorities
continue to Lse secret evidence to lock
up immigrants in deportation proceed-
ings, to exclude aliens at the border, and
to oppose applications for "relief from
deportation," including asylum. The
practice of relying on secret evidence in
immigration proceedings dates back to
the 1950s, but INS used the tactic more
aggressively in the late 1 990s, in part
because in 1996 Congress expanded its
authority to do so in two statutes-the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penal-
ty Act and the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act. Increased use of secret evidence by
INS, however, has thus far backfired.
The INS has suffered an unbroken string
of losses in the courts, come under
growing criticism from Congress, and
had its practices criticized by both the
Republican and Democratic candidates
for president during the election. Yet the
practice continues.
String of Losses
Nasser Ahmed. One month after Hany
Kiareldeen was released, INS also
released Nasser Ahmed, an Egyptian
who had been detained for over three
and one-half years in New York, most of
that time in solitary confinement, based
solely on secret evidence. At the outset
of Ahmed's detention, INS officials took
the position that the secret evidence
against him could not even be summa-
rized but was sufficient to detain him as
a national security threat. As a result, he
was told nothing about the government's
evidence against him-and thus could
not refute what he could not see. Years
later-and only after Ahmed filed a con-
stitutional challenge--INS disclosed
some of its charges and declassified
approximately fifty pages of previously
secret evidence, and Ahmed was able to
rebut the government's charges. The
same judge who had previously found
Ahmed a national security threat
reversed himself after hearing Ahmed's
side of the story and sharply criticized
the government for having misled him.
Much of the evidence declassified in
Ahmed's case should never have been
classified in the first place. One allega-
tion, for example, maintained that
Ahmed was associated with Sheik Omar
Abdel-Rahman, convicted for plotting to
bomb tunnels and buildings around
Manhattan. But Ahmed's association
with Abdel-Rahman was no secret;
Ahmed had served as the sheik's court-
appointed paralegal and translator dur-
ing Abdel-Rahman's criminal trial.
Another revelation was testimony that
Ahmed's detention by INS had made
him a hero in the Muslim community
and his release would increase his politi-
cal stature. In the end, the immigration
judge ruled that INS evidence did not
establish any threat to national security,
the Board of Immigration Appeals
affirmed, and the Attorney General
declined to intervene.
Ali Yasin Mohammed Karim. In
August 2000, Dr. Ali Yasin Mohammed
Karim was released after having spent
years in custody based on secret evi-
dence. In 1998, INS relied on secret evi-
dence to detain and deny entry to Dr.
Karim and several other Iraqis who were
accused of being double agents after the
U.S. airlifted them from Iraq on the heels
of a failed CIA-backed coup attempt
against Saddam Hussein. After former CIA
Director James Woolsey brought substan-
tial congressional and media pressure to
bear on INS, the agency declassified
more than 500 pages of previously secret
evidence, and Dr. Karim was able to
rebut the government's charges.
These are not isolated instances.
Since 1987, I have represented thirteen
aliens against whom INS sought to use
secret evidence. At one time, INS
claimed that all thirteen posed a direct
threat to the security of the nation, and
that the evidence to support that asser-
tion could not be revealed--in many
instances could not even be summa-
rized-without jeopardizing national
security. In none of these cases did the
evidence even allege, much less prove,
that the aliens had engaged in or sup-
ported criminal or terrorist activity. The
government's allegations amounted to
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only guilt by association. In virtually all
of the government's secret evidence
cases in the 1 990s, the aliens targeted
were Arabs and/or Muslims.
Today, all thirteen persons whom I
represented are free, living law-abiding
and peaceable lives here in the U.S.,
with no apparent adverse consequences
to the security of the nation. Where the
cases have been resolved in the federal
courts, the courts have declared the use
of secret evidence unconstitutional.
Where the cases were resolved in the
immigration process, immigration judges
uniformly rejected the government's
national security claims as unwarranted.
Can Secret Trials Be Fair?
The INS track record in these cases illus-
trates why adjudications of human liber-
ty should never be based on
undisclosed evidence, and why every
court to address the issue in the last thir-
teen years has declared the practice
unconstitutional. As the Supreme Court
said, "[f]airness can rarely be obtained
by secret, one-sided determination of
facts decisive of rights." (Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975).)
The immigration statute and regula-
tions impose virtually no safeguards on
the use of secret evidence. If it can, INS is
supposed to provide the alien with an
unclassified summary of the evidence,
but the law does not require a summary
of the charges, which may consist of a
single sentence. Ahmed was given a
summary that said only that he had an
"association with a known terrorist orga-
nization." The INS would not even reveal
the name of the group, much less when
and how Ahmed had been associated
and what, if anything, he allegedly did
for the group. The immigration judge in
his case characterized the summary as
"largely useless," but found that it com-
plied with INS regulations.
Declassified summaries will rarely
afford an alien a fair opportunity to
defend himself, for the simple reason
that one cannot cross-examine a sum-
mary. In many instances, the source is
the most important piece of information;
yet in most cases, it is the source that the
government seeks to keep confidential.
When Hany Kiareldeen surmised that
the source in his case might be his ex-
wife, he subpoenaed her to testify, and
INS fought his efforts every step of the
way. On the stand, she admitted to hav-
ing spoken with the FBI but refused to
provide details, and INS objected to any
questioning along those lines.
Knowing that one's evidence cannot
be challenged by one's adversaries con-
tributes to sloppy practices. In its in cam-
era presentations, INS has often relied on
double and triple hearsay assertions by
FBI agents and has failed to produce orig-
inal declarants, even when asked to do
so by the immigration judge.
Aliens' Rights
The government defends its practice by
arguing that aliens do not deserve the full
panoply of due process protections in
deportation proceedings. But the Due
Process Clause protects all "persons"-it
is not limited to citizens. The Supreme
Court held that it protects even aliens
here unlawfully. (Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67 (1976).) Even if aliens enjoyed
diminished due process protection, the
rights denied by the use of secret evi-
dence are the bare minima required by
due process-nothing is more fundamen-
tal than the rights to notice of the evi-
dence against one and a meaningful
opportunity to defend oneself.
The government also argues that it
should not have to make the "Hobson's
choice" of disclosing classified informa-
tion and thereby imperiling the national
security or allowing a dangerous alien to
remain at large. But, the government
makes such decisions every day with
regard to citizens. In no other setting is
the government permitted to deprive
someone of liberty without affording him
a meaningful opportunity to defend him-
self. In criminal cases, the government is
never permitted to rely on secret evi-
dence, no matter how serious the charge
and no matter how much confidential or
classified information implicates the
defendant. This rule applies to the prose-
cution of terrorists, spies, and mass mur-
derers. We have survived as a nation for
more than 200 years abiding by that
basic rule of due process. There is no
reason we cannot and should not extend
the same rule to immigrants when we
seek to deprive them of their liberty and
imprison or deport them.
Secret evidence is counterproductive.
It distorts the truth-finding process, so
that we cannot be certain whether we
have properly identified the real threats
to national security. It embroils the gov-
ernment in protracted litigation because
the adversary process is so ill-suited to
this practice. And most problematically,
it breeds cynicism, paranoia, and dis-
trust in immigrant communities, because
closed-door proceedings understandably
make people fear the worst. That distrust
in turn impedes the ability of law
enforcement to identity true threats in
immigrant communities, because to
many the FBI and INS are viewed as
enemy rather than protector.
Under Attack
For all of these reasons, the practice of
secret evidence is Linder attack. In the
last Congress, Representatives Toni
Campbell (R-CA) and David Bonior (D-
MI) introduced legislation to end the
practice. The bill garnered more than
100 co-sponsors from both parties. Late
in the session, the House Judiciary
Committee sent an amended version of
the bill to the house floor. The bill
would have permitted the government
to use classified information in immi-
gration proceedings only where it could
provide the alien with a summary that
afforded him substantially the same
opportunity to defend himself. It did not
come Lip for a vote on the floor by ses-
sion's end, but the issue will no doubt
be taken up again in the new Congress.
President George W. Bush openly con-
demned the practice of secret evidence
in the second televised presidential
campaign debate.
The bottom line, however, is that INS
continues to use secret evidence and to
maintain its right to do so. No system of
justice can be deemed legitimate that
denies to incarcerated human beings the
right to examine and confront the evi-
dence used to detain them.
David Cole is a professor at Georgetown
University Law Center in Washington,
D.(. and a volunteer lawyer with the Cen-
ter for Constitutional Rights in New York.
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